

‘You chiefs are only the eyes of the government’:

Msikofeni KaKhukhulela and the Natal Rebellion of 1906

by Milner Snell

Msikofeni KaKhukhulela was *inkosi* of the Khuze chiefdom of southern KwaZulu-Natal from 1897 to 1921.¹ He became chief at a time when the colonial government was selling off land, on which the Khuze had lived for generations, to white farmers. While Msikofeni’s adherents struggled to retain access to land, settlers were expanding agricultural production and worked to weaken the chiefdom they regarded as a barrier to their farming operations. The aims of this article are to look at Msikofeni’s interaction with settler leaders and colonial officials and to trace their efforts to divide the chiefdom and undermine the chief’s authority. A pivotal point in this relationship was the

Natal Rebellion of 1906. Military and civilian leaders considered Msikofeni and his men complicit in the rebellion, although there is little proof of this, and used the uprising to achieve their aim of splitting the chiefdom. The break up of the chiefdom highlighted two other issues: the increasing influence of white farmers in southern Natal; and how a court *induna* manipulated the situation to achieve his own ambitions.

‘There are no location lands’: the Khuze’s struggle for land

Msikofeni became *inkosi* in 1897 at a time when his adherents were struggling to retain access to land against a backdrop of the expansion of commercial agriculture. To understand the

interaction between the chiefdom and white officials and farmers we need briefly to trace the history of land in the Ixopo area.² In the 1820s the Khuze migrated from the lower Mzinyathi River and eventually settled on the southern bank of the Umkomazi River. In 1843 the area in which the chiefdom had lived for almost two decades became part of the British Colony of Natal. When the British annexed Natal they divided land into two categories: locations (or reserves) and Crown Land. Locations comprised one sixth of the total area of Natal. Crown Land, the remaining five sixths, was allocated to private owners, development companies and mission reserves.³ In many cases Africans had inhabited Crown Land for two or three generations before annexation. The Natal Land and Colonization Company bought large tracts of Crown Land in the Ixopo district relatively cheaply with the aim of making high profits by selling farms to immigrants. However, with few settlers moving beyond Richmond until the late 1870s, African tenants occupied most of the company's land.⁴ This ensured access to land, but the occupants resented the rents and grazing fees. Sijewana KaMjanyelwa told James Stuart that the *Kampani* 'is a very heavy pressure on the natives. The system of taxation and collection of taxes is a real hardship on the people, and there is much severe suffering in consequence. Natives are not able to live in other parts as there is no land they can go to'.⁵

In 1873 the government suspended the selling of Crown Land to stop it falling into the hands of speculators. However, in 1878 they lifted the moratorium. Most Crown Land was bought by white farmers who either charged rents to Africans who continued living on the land or evicted them. In 1882 of

the 5 000 Africans living on land that was sold in the Ixopo area, 2 150 were served with notices to leave.⁶ Those who were evicted either had to move onto locations or became tenants of white farmers who were prepared to accept them. Of the 485 069 acres of Crown Land sold in the Colony, a quarter was bought by Africans.⁷ At Ixopo this amounted to 66 239 acres.⁸ There was, as a result, temporarily an increase in the amount of land owned by Africans, but from the late 1880s these gains slowed down and were even reversed. An economic depression in the latter half of the 1880s affected the leasing and purchasing of Crown Land. Many Africans were battling to pay instalments on the land they had purchased. From 1886 there was a noticeable increase in the letters of demand being issued for overdue instalments that resulted in many Africans surrendering land to the government.

By 1900 Crown Lands were almost exhausted and pressure was placed on the Natal Land and Colonization Company to sell their properties. When the colonial administration threatened to tax 'unused' land, the company began selling off its holdings, most of which was bought by the government and in turn sold to white farmers.⁹ As this happened evictions continued, while at the same time rents increased. In May 1904 the magistrate at Ixopo informed Msikofeni that from July the rent for those who resided on Crown Lands would increase from £1 to £2 per hut. The chief protested and described the increase as 'eating his people'.¹⁰ In 1911, fourteen homesteads of Msikofeni's adherents were ordered off Dr Sutherland's estate at the Inhlavini for not paying rents.¹¹ Msikofeni appeared before the magistrate in Ixopo and stated, 'I would ask that Govt intervene or offer some

assistance to these people in allotting to me some Location ground. I am thinking of but all those who are residing on the land recently purchased from the Colonization Co'.¹² The acting chief native commissioner in his letter to the magistrate of Ixopo pointed out that 'there are no Location Lands which are available for occupation by the Natives referred to, unless Chief Miskofeli can find kraal sites for them on that portion of the Location already occupied by members of his tribe'.¹³ The commissioner suggested 'the best course for these people to adopt is to approach one or more of the land owners' of the division. Later in the year eviction orders were served on tenants on a further fourteen farms in Ixopo.¹⁴ Msikofeni himself resided as a tenant of Walter Oakes on the farm Doorn Vlakte.¹⁵

'Obey all orders of the government': Msikofeni and the magistrate

While the Khuze struggled to retain access to land, most white officials and farmers considered them a hindrance to their own aims and a danger to their security. Thus from 1897 to 1906 they worked to divide the chieftdom and weaken Msikofeni's position by portraying him negatively in their reports and eroding his authority among his followers. Most of the information that reached the secretary for native affairs (SNA) in Pietermaritzburg, and what comprises the written record to this day, about Msikofeni and the Khuze came from reports and letters written by the magistrate at Ixopo, Frank Foxon. Foxon had joined the civil service as a clerk and Zulu interpreter in the Umnjeni division in 1880. He steadily made his way up the ranks of the civil service until he was appointed administrator of

native law at Impendle in 1889.¹⁶ By the time he was appointed magistrate at Ixopo in July 1897, he had a reputation for being dictatorial and biased.¹⁷

When Msikofeni became chief in 1897, Foxon objected to his appointment as he considered the chief 'insolent' and the Khuze 'troublesome'.¹⁸ He recommended Msikofeni's influence be reduced by appointing him chief over the people who lived in the Ixopo district only.¹⁹ Foxon in his reports often stressed that Msikofeni was a threat to the white inhabitants of Ixopo. He emphasised that Msikofeni was the grandson of Langalibalele, who had been involved in a serious confrontation with the colonial government in 1873, and therefore could not be trusted.²⁰ In June 1903 Foxon portrayed the chief in a particularly sinister manner when he wrote to the under-secretary of native affairs that 'I have been informed confidentially by European farmers and by Detective Officer Walton and the Natal Police that Chief Miskofeli is constantly sending out parties with arms to hunt, their object is to murder some person, as the head and certain parts of the human body are required by the Doctors who are attending Miskofeli'.²¹

Foxon, and other colonial officials as we shall see, often attempted to publicly undermine Msikofeni's authority among his adherents. In May 1904, for example, Foxon informed Msikofeni that from July the rent on Crown Lands would double. The chief protested against the increase and attempted to ride away but was brought back and 'kept as a prisoner' until Foxon was ready to address him.²² The magistrate informed him:

He was appointed Chief to assist the Government, and not because he had a right by birth to claim the

Chieftainship and that if he did anything wrong he would be removed from the position, the same as several others have been deposed and that he must clearly understand he must always obey all orders of the Government otherwise he will be severely punished.²³

'A war cry by an unknown person from the hills': the 1906 Rebellion

In early February 1906 two white policemen were killed near Richmond while attempting to arrest men protesting against the poll tax. This was the beginning of a conflict which has been referred to by numerous names, including the Bhambhatha, Zulu or Natal Rebellion. On 9 February, martial law was proclaimed by the governor and troops in the Colony were placed under the command of Colonel Duncan McKenzie to suppress the unrest at Richmond. McKenzie considered two chiefs in particular in southern Natal to be encouraging rebellion – Tilonko of the Mbo and Msikofeni.²⁴ Foxon held the same views and reported on 1 February to the SNA that Msikofeni had not informed his people they should pay tax.²⁵ Matters were quiet but tense until 12 February when there were reports that some of Msikofeni's men had assembled armed at the chief's homestead. On 14 February, the magistrate at Richmond, J.Y. Gibson, met Msikofeni near Waterfall farm to enquire if his followers had armed and if so for what reason. Msikofeni denied that his men had taken up arms and insisted that he had informed his people about the poll tax.²⁶ While James Stuart was of the opinion that Gibson's 'tact and discretion' calmed the situation, farmers at Richmond successfully approached the government to remove the magistrate

over his handling of the unrest.²⁷ Among the allegations levelled at him was that he had publicly stated that he did not believe Msikofeni's people were arming themselves.²⁸

On 17 February, McKenzie had received instructions from the commandant of the militia, Colonel H.T. Bru-de-Wold that he should make his way through the Ixopo district because of the rumours of unrest. He instructed McKenzie that if Msikofeni did not appear voluntarily:

You will then summon Miskofeli to come and see you, assuring him of his personal safety. If he comes and explains his previous non-appearance to your satisfaction, and effects the arrest of the members of his tribe who armed, he will not be punished, but if his explanation is not considered satisfactory you may, if you think fit, punish him by a fine of cattle. If the Chief refuses or delays to come to you on being again summoned and warned that if he neglects to appear before you he will be severely punished, you will burn his kraal and seize his cattle at your discretion, and if you see fit, disarm his tribe and put down any armed resistance. Under no circumstances will you arrest the Chief if he attends before you.²⁹

McKenzie left Richmond on the morning of the 19 February, crossed the Umkomazi and camped that night in the vicinity of Waterfall.³⁰ The next day he marched through Msikofeni's territory to a trading store on the farm Lloyd which was owned by Edward Garland in the vicinity of the Springvale Mission. Here they bivouacked for the night so as to give Msikofeni a chance to report to McKenzie. Garland had been sent to Natal in 1876 from England by the Natal Land and Colonization Company to help administer their large land holdings.³¹

For his services he received a portion of Lloyd on which he now farmed and traded. The trader informed McKenzie he knew Msikofeni and would 'try to bring him up if he so wished'.³² McKenzie had no objection and Garland rode off to the chief who, accompanied by a handful of followers, reported at McKenzie's camp at about 5 p.m. McKenzie informed the chief he was pleased he had come to pay his respects but as it was late he did not want to discuss the unrest in the country in any great detail but would call for him in a few days' time. Msikofeni then requested that he be given a pass to proceed to Pietermaritzburg to interview the SNA, S.O. Samuelson. Many Africans preferred to deal with Samuelson rather than the political appointees who only served as minister for native affairs for short periods and generally had a reputation for being unsympathetic. The incumbent in 1906, H. Winter, has been described as 'a somewhat narrow man, with the stereotyped views about Africans'.³³ McKenzie sent the message on to Pietermaritzburg via Foxon, but Samuelson responded that Msikofeni was in McKenzie's hands and whether he signed the pass or not was up to him.³⁴ This was a fairly typical Samuelson response to the situation. Samuelson, despite his knowledge of Zulu, saw his role to carry out the policies of the political head of the department. Many Africans referred to him as *Vumazonke*, one who agrees to all, or *Ndambili*, Mr facing-both-ways.³⁵ H.C. Lugg, who served under him, put it more bluntly – 'although a knowledgeable and conscientious official, [he] lacked backbone'.³⁶

Msikofeni's visit defused a tense situation and McKenzie had no reason to arrest him or burn his homestead and confiscate his cattle. McKenzie was still

convinced that there was a great deal of unrest amongst Msikofeni's followers, but at this point placed more blame on Msikofeni's *induna* Mamba who lived in the Richmond district and oversaw the Khuze north of the Umkomazi. From Garland's store colonial troops marched to Highflats, arriving at this small village in the afternoon of 21 February. McKenzie had deliberately taken the route from Waterfall to Highflats so as to march through the area most densely populated by the Khuze.

Fines and floggings at Ixopo

McKenzie informed the magistrate of Ixopo to instruct Msikofeni, as well as five other chiefs, to appear before him at Ixopo on Friday 23 February. McKenzie's force arrived at Ixopo on the same day to find the white population had left their farms in a panic and taken refuge in a fortification in the town. Colonial troops encamped at Ixopo until 13 March. From 3 to 12 March McKenzie held a number of court martials. The hearings took place on 28 February and 2 and 5 March. Thirty-four of Msikofeni's men were tried for sedition and insurrection. Two days before the first hearing, Msikofeni brought in eight men who had armed themselves and his people started paying tax. William Harte of the Natal Carbineers wrote on 26 February, 'Umskofeli brought in 8 of the men who were known to have gone about the country armed [and] about 500 of his men came in and paid their Poll Tax, so that the native unrest is practically over here and as soon as the armed natives have been court-martialed we shall probably go back to Richmond'.³⁷ Jeff Guy points out that the moral pressure put on Msikofeni, and other *inkosi*, to hand over their own men, who they often knew were wrongly accused,

was a cruel thing to do.³⁸ Msikofeni, in particular, was 'bullied, threatened and fined by the military'.³⁹

The hearings continued and Msikofeni was fined 100 head of cattle as many of his men were reported to be armed and roaming about the country.⁴⁰ Msikofeni was held responsible for preparing for trouble by concealing his wives and property in inaccessible country.⁴¹ He was given until 9 March to pay the fine. Many of his men were fined and sentenced to be flogged before a crowd of almost 900 in front of the Ixopo courthouse.⁴² Harte witnessed the floggings and recorded, 'Close to us was a triangle on which a number of the prisoners were subsequently tied to in turn and thrashed with a cat-of-nine-tails!! I saw five go through the process... All the natives witnessed the punishment. The "cat" was ably applied on their backs and in a number of cases drew blood'.⁴³ Six of Msikofeni's followers were sentenced to death for sedition. The governor-in-council commuted the sentences of five.

'A reliable native' and 'an unknown person from the hills': colonial justice

McKenzie's actions against the Khuze in February and March were motivated by, first, his belief that the Khuze were preparing to take up arms and were conspiring with other Africans to overthrow white rule; and, second, that Msikofeni was 'a man of considerable influence' and that if he were made an example of it would subdue the other *inkosi*.⁴⁴ In a dispatch to Bru-de-Wold from Ixopo on the 25 February 1906 McKenzie wrote:

The general impression is that there was great unrest in Msikofeni's tribe. Evidence goes to prove that Msikofeni's men did arm. Mamba

is Msikofeni's induna in charge on the north side of the Umkomaas. His son informed me that the war cry was given in his section of the tribe by an unknown person from the hills on this side without the chief's knowledge. This however shows that the tribe was organized and ready... There is no doubt that Chiefs have been communicating with each other with a view to combination, as in the imposition of the poll-tax. They consider they have a general cause for complaint.⁴⁵

He concluded: 'Both the Magistrate and myself feel that if Msikofeni and his people pay the poll-tax the others will follow suit, and it is to this end that I am working'.⁴⁶

What evidence does McKenzie have to draw the conclusion that the Khuze were preparing for a rebellion and that there was a general conspiracy? Only two pieces are mentioned. First, a local farmer at Highflats, J. Gold, informed McKenzie on 21 February that 'that a reliable native of his had informed him that Miskofeli, Gileni, Munyu and Ngangezwe were to join with other Chiefs and break out into open rebellion on Sunday the 18th instant. This was the original programme and one which was upset by hearing that this column was at Richmond ready to advance through the country'.⁴⁷ Second, Mamba's son told him that the war cry was given by an unknown person from the hills. It was not uncommon for officials to rely on reports from local farmers who obtained news from loyal servants. These reports were notoriously unreliable. At the end of January, for example, Henry Nicholson reported on 'good authority' that Magidigidi of the Chunu had fined his followers who tried to pay the poll tax. The reply from the department was that the Chunu had 'paid up their Poll Tax satisfactory'.⁴⁸ When Tilonko of the

Mbo was tried after the rebellion, one of the witnesses, Sangqubu kaSizanaya, testified that a local farmer had told him what to say in his statement and that he had signed it after being threatened.⁴⁹

Not all local farmers or colonial officials held the view that the Khuze were arming to rebel. Garland informed McKenzie that the Khuze had armed to protect Msikofeni from being arrested. James Stuart, although he supported the need for McKenzie's column to march through Ixopo, was also of the opinion that 'under the belief that an attempt was to be made to arrest their Chief, responded to some extent to a call to arms circulated on the night of the 12th'.⁵⁰ Gibson was eventually transferred because he publicly stated the Khuze were not taking up arms. Recent historians have rejected the idea of an uprising among the Khuze. Shula Marks concluded that 'there was nothing whatever in the evidence to show they [the Khuze] intended resisting McKenzie's forces' and 'everything points to the fact that they assembled in arms to prevent his arrest'.⁵¹

'The government and not their chiefs were rulers of the country': executions at Richmond

At the beginning of April 1906 those men implicated in the death of the policemen at Richmond in early February were executed. Msikofeni was instructed on 31 March to report to Richmond at 10 a.m. on 2 April to witness their deaths. Although he left on 1 April, he and his retinue arrived just after noon as the second batch of prisoners, a group of young boys, were being led to the place of their execution.⁵² Msikofeni refused to watch and focused on the guard and played nervously with his hat while the firing squad carried out their

task.⁵³ Colonel Royston, commander of the Border Mounted Rifles, addressed the Africans, informing them that they had been ordered to watch the executions because the supreme chief wanted to show them that the government and not their chiefs were the rulers of the country.⁵⁴ He then pointed at Msikofeni and continued with his diatribe:

You salute this boy, and you spoil him by the reverence and obedience you pay him; but I tell you, Miskofeni, and you other chiefs, that in case of further trouble, the government will search out and punish you for your disobedience and neglect of your duty, in not controlling your men. You chiefs are only the eyes of the government; and yet, knowing this, you take to yourselves powers you do not possess. The result of such conduct you have seen today, and I hope it will be a lesson, not only for old men and heads of kraals, but for young men growing up around you.⁵⁵

Colonel Weighton, of the Natal Carbineers, then called Msikofeni and demanded to know why he had arrived late. The chief replied that the messenger had told him to arrive at about noon. Weighton admonished the chief telling him in future he should arrive earlier than instructed. Royston, like McKenzie and Foxon, was determined to make a public example of any chief who was considered recalcitrant so as to discourage other leaders baulking at the colonial government.

There was a great irony found in Royston's speech that highlighted the general attitude towards Msikofeni and other *inkosi*. Msikofeni was considered to be taking on powers he did not possess and his followers were reminded that he was just a boy who was given undue reverence, yet he was expected to arrange the collection of the poll tax amongst his supporters, deliver men

to the authorities who were alleged to have armed themselves, and to generally control these same men.

'Miskofeli is not fit to hold the position of chief': the breaking up of the chiefdom

Farmers and magistrates used the events of February and March 1906 to continue their agenda to break up the chiefdom. On 10 March, Foxon wrote on behalf of himself and the magistrates at Richmond and Bulwer to the USNA recommending Msikofeni be deposed and removed to some distant part of the Colony.⁵⁶ He argued that he had been fined for 'knowingly allowing his people to arm for the purpose of resisting the Government of the Colony' which 'proves that Miskofeli is not fit to hold the position of Chief especially over so large a tribe'.⁵⁷ He went on to recommend the chiefdom be placed under four or more chiefs and that the main portion living near the Inhlavini River be placed under Msikofeni's brother, Matikela.⁵⁸ Marks points out that white farmers and the magistrate had been petitioning for the breaking up of the chiefdom from as early as 1897 when Msikofeni became head of the Khuze as they feared he would resist their expansion.⁵⁹

By the early 1900s the white population of Richmond and Ixopo was large enough to push their interests more forcibly through agricultural societies and later the Legislative Council. In 1893 the Colony of Natal had obtained responsible government and a Legislative Council consisting of 37 members was elected that favoured voters in rural areas. James Schofield, a prosperous farmer, was elected as the member for Ixopo. It was Foxon, Schofield and prominent farmers, in particular John Marwick, who worked together with a

local court *induna* to split the chiefdom.

On 21 March 1906, the minister for native affairs informed the magistrate of the Upper Umkomanzi it had been decided to divide the chiefdom under Msikofeni into three and instructed him to assemble principal kraal heads 'to nominate a suitable person who could be placed over the new Tribe to be formed' in the Richmond district.⁶⁰ He made it clear that 'should there be a nomination of Mamba by the people, this should not be accepted'.⁶¹ The magistrate called a meeting on 29 March which was attended by approximately 130 headmen. Those present nominated Msalo, a brother to Msikofeni. After the meeting twelve men, tenants of a well-known local farmer J.S. Marwick and leader of the Richmond Reserves, dissented and suggested Msiwakeni Tshezi, the court *induna* at Richmond be appointed. The magistrate was concerned 'that he would have difficulty in securing the affections of the people'.⁶² The magistrate must have been aware that Msiwakeni caused friction by deliberately insulting chiefs, keeping people waiting and controlling access to the court.⁶³ The minister for native affairs, however, recommended Msiwakeni be appointed regardless of the magistrate's concerns or that most men present at the original meeting had nominated Msalo. The farmers at Richmond also supported the appointment of Msiwakeni. Schofield tried to justify the interference of farmers in the appointment, writing 'It's wrong for a rebellious tribe to be allowed to nominate a chief who of course in all probability will be a rebel. The suggestion is that Europeans here should be allowed to nominate a man for the position.'⁶⁴ The chiefdom was split between Msikofeni, his brother Pata and Msiwakeni. Marwick requested that the announcement be delayed while

the militia was still in Zululand as he feared that Msikofeni might take 'aggressive action' when he heard.⁶⁵

Marks points out that Msiwakeni had influenced Foxon's belief that Msikofeni was rebellious.⁶⁶ Msiwakeni, according to Foxon, had given him 'most valuable information in connection with the recent Rebellion'.⁶⁷ Msiwakeni was not an anomaly. Throughout Natal and Zululand courts *izinduna* served as gatekeepers to magistrates and so gained great influence. Many of them grew 'rich in cattle and other property'.⁶⁸ Some gathered followers around them and were appointed chiefs by the colonial government. The rebellion gave Msiwakeni the opportunity to work with white farmers to fulfill his own ambitions, although as Marks comments 'one wonders in this situation who was making use of whom'.⁶⁹

Even after the break up of the chiefdom, farmers continued to push for action against Msikofeni. In May a petition from the residents of Ixopo praying that Msikofeni be deposed and removed from the Colony was sent to the secretary.⁷⁰ At times the interference of white farmers annoyed officials in Pietermaritzburg. After a public meeting in Ixopo called by the Farmers' Association, Schofield wrote in July 1906 to Prime Minister Charles Smythe, 'it is imperative that the government should take proceedings against the Chief'. In his response Smythe pointed out that 'no definite charge was made by Col McKenzie against Miskofeli' and that he had already been fined 100 head of cattle.⁷¹ Alexander Gilson, who temporarily acted as magistrate at Richmond after the transfer of Gibson, criticised the 'impertinence of Marwick who 'tried to interfere in this office in native matters'.⁷²

'Allow the law to take its course': Msikofeni's execution

In 1921 Msikofeni and two other men, Sotwana Mlizi and Gebhlumoba Ngubo, were charged for fatally poisoning Chief Mjila of the Memela on 26 January of that year. The trial took place from 12 to 29 August 1921. The men were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. They lodged an appeal and the governor-general commuted the sentence of Ngubo to life imprisonment. In the case of Msikofeni and Mlizi the governor-general decided 'to allow the law to take its course'.⁷³ Msikofeni was executed in Pietermaritzburg at 7 a.m. on 14 December 1921. He had converted to Catholicism and his body was returned to Ixopo and buried at Mariathal Mission Station.

From his appointment as chief in 1897, white officials and farmers, who were gaining more influence through the Legislative Council after responsible government, strove to weaken the Khuze chiefdom and Msikofeni who was regarded as a barrier to their farming operations and a threat to their safety. They petitioned for the chiefdom to be divided, described Msikofeni in their reports as unco-operative and worked to undermine his authority among his followers. Although there was no proof that the Khuze or Msikofeni had intended joining the 1906 uprising, Foxon and farmers at Ixopo and Richmond doubled their efforts, insisting the chiefdom was a threat and were ultimately successful in having the chiefdom split and placed under Msikofeni, Pata and Msiwakeni Tshezi. Msiwakeni was the unpopular but ambitious court *induna* who played an important part in convincing Foxon that Msikofeni was going to rebel in 1906.

NOTES

- 1 There are at least five forms of the spelling of his name in records in the archives and secondary sources: Msikofeni, Miskofeli, Miskofili, Miskefeni and Msikofeli. I have used the spelling of Msikofeni, except in quotes.
- 2 I have used the spelling Ixopo as that was the official name of the area under discussion when the events took place.
- 3 Ingrid Machin, *Antbears and Targets for Zulu Assegais: The Levying of Forced Labour and Military Service by the Colonial State of Natal* (Howick: Brevitas, 2002), p. 41.
- 4 Anthony J. Christopher, 'The Natal Land and Colonization Company in colonial times' *Natalia* 4 (1974), pp. 49 and 52.
- 5 Colin de B. Webb and John B. Wright (eds), *The James Stuart Archive, Volume 5* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), p. 331.
- 6 John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), p. 81.
- 7 *ibid.*, p. 75.
- 8 *ibid.*
- 9 Christopher, 'The Natal Land and Colonization Company in colonial times', p. 53.
- 10 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR), SNA, I/ 1/310 979/1904, Magistrate of Ixopo to under-secretary of native affairs (USNA), 17 May 1904.
- 11 PAR, CNC, 34 CNC 1466/1911.
- 12 *ibid.*
- 13 *ibid.*
- 14 PAR, SGO, III/1/296 SGI79/1911.
- 15 Doorn Vlake (or Doornvlakte), now called Dawn Valley, was granted to Theunis Botha in 1852. Walter Oakes bought the farm in 1865 and lived on it until his death in 1930.
- 16 Foxon's career in Natal is drawn from his entry in *The Natal Who's Who* (Durban: Robinson, 1906), p. 70.
- 17 Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906–1908 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 156.
- 18 PAR, SNA, I/1/310 979/1904, Minute from Magistrate Ixopo to SNA, 12 May 1904.
- 19 *ibid.*
- 20 *ibid.*
- 21 PAR, SNA, I/1/302 1810/1903, Magistrate Ixopo to USNA, 2 June 1903.
- 22 PAR, SNA, I/ 1/310 979/1904, Magistrate Ixopo to USNA, 17 May 1904.
- 23 *ibid.*
- 24 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 193.
- 25 PAR, SNA, I/1/335 357/06, Magistrate Ixopo to USNA, 1 February 1906.
- 26 James Stuart, *A History of the Zulu Rebellion* (London: McMillan, 1913), pp. 141–142.
- 27 *ibid.*
- 28 Paul S. Thompson, *Incident at Trewirgie: First Shots of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906* (Pietermaritzburg: 2005), p. 57.
- 29 Walter Bosman, *The Natal Rebellion of 1906* (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), pp. 6–7.
- 30 Stuart, *A History of the Zulu Rebellion*, p. 141.
- 31 Val Woodley, *On the High Flats of Natal* (Highflats: Maxann Books, 1984), p. 90.
- 32 Bosman, *The Natal Rebellion of 1906*, p. 8.
- 33 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 24.
- 34 PAR, SNA, I/1/336 532/1906, Magistrate Ixopo to USNA, 19 July 1906.
- 35 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 25.
- 36 Harry C. Lugg, *A Natal Family Looks Back* (Durban: T.W. Griggs, 1970), p. 93.
- 37 Mark Coghlán, 'The record of a racist killer? William Harte, Natal Carbineers, 1906' *Natalia* 35 (2005), p. 38.
- 38 Jeff Guy, *Remembering the Rebellion: The Zulu Uprising of 1906* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006), p. 52.
- 39 *ibid.*
- 40 Stuart, *A History of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906*, p. 142.
- 41 *ibid.*
- 42 Guy, *Remembering the Rebellion*, p. 52.
- 43 Coghlán, 'The record of a racist killer?', p. 38.
- 44 Napier Devitt, *Gallopings Jack: Being the Reminiscences of Brigadier-General John Robinson Royston* (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1937), p. 57.
- 45 Bosman, *The Natal Rebellion of 1906*, p. 9.
- 46 *ibid.*, p. 12.
- 47 *ibid.*, p. 10.
- 48 PAR, SNA, I/1/335 365/06, Nicholson to PM, 31 January 1906.
- 49 Guy, *Remembering the Rebellion*, pp. 56–57.
- 50 Stuart, *A History of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906*, p. 139.
- 51 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 195.
- 52 Thompson, *Incident at Trewirgie*, p. 2.
- 53 *ibid.*, p. 3.
- 54 *ibid.*
- 55 *ibid.*
- 56 PAR, SNA, I/1/337 781/06, Magistrate Ixopo to USNA, 10 March 1906.
- 57 *ibid.*
- 58 *ibid.*
- 59 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 193–194.
- 60 PAR, SNA, I/1/338 873/06, minister of native affairs (MNA) to Magistrate Upper Umkomanzi, 21 March 1906.
- 61 *ibid.*, MNA to Magistrate Upper Umkomanzi, 28 March 1906.

62 *ibid.*, Magistrate Upper Umkomanzi to MNA,
31 March 1906.

63 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 321.

64 PAR, SNA, 1/1/338 873/06, Schofield to MNA,
8 April 1906.

65 Thompson, *Incident at Trewirgie*, p. 74.

66 Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, p. 321.

67 *ibid.*

68 *ibid.*

69 *ibid.*, p. 322.

70 PAR, SNA, 1/1/348 1489/06, Vause to USNA,
14 May 1906.

71 PAR, PM, 61 888/1906, Schofield to USNA.

72 Thompson, *Incident at Trewirgie*, p. 74.

73 PAR, NHC, 5/8/4 case 47.